Yes my friend, I am a space farmer. I grow zero-gravity crystals, harvest helium-3 from the moon's surface, and extract drinking water from asteroids, all for the benefit of mankind. I am a space farmer.
Regarding the Politico article headlined as Judge: NYT reporter need not identify sources, there’s this profound comment/question:
If a reporter can provide confidential treatment to a person breaking a Federal law can a ‘fence’ provide confidential treatment to a thief who sold him stolen goods? If not, why not?
Leona Helmsley provided the answer: laws are for little people.
Thought of the day: when it comes to space, government isn’t the solution, it’s the problem.
Alternate thought of the day: A friendlier term for corporate welfare is [space] “industrial policy.”
Tertiary thought of the day: we have somehow come to baseline our space programs on Cold War prestige efforts like manned space flight (and with an expectation of corresponding funding).
Russia has been unable to make progress with lower-level U.S. politicos on missile defense. This makes the Russians unhappy. Their plan is to now try and backdoor the whole bureaucratic process and go directly to the President at an unspecified-yet-upcoming face-to-face meeting with Medvedev. Meanwhile, higher-level administration politicos are saying the administration “would not accede to any deal limiting U.S. antimissile options.” Sounds like the lower-level politicos are just following orders, right?
And what are we to make of the Russians and their dread fear of missile defense? One thing comes to mind: they must think missile defense has a pretty reasonable chance of upsetting their strategic nuclear apple-cart.
How else to explain the alternating and yet unending Russian drum beat of good cop (“there are no grounds for pessimism” for U.S. concessions on missile defense) – bad cop (if “Russia does not discover itself as an invited nation in this [NATO] missile defense architecture, this will cause great problems in our relations")? You can’t.
The Russians are surely preoccupied with this thought: missile defense can hold nuclear weapons and delivery systems (Iranian, Russian, et al) at risk. And if the President of the United States had a chance to stop a Russian nuclear weapon from impacting on U.S./allied soil by using this missile defense system, it would be used.
Who, to paraphrase President Merkin Muffley, could face the history books with the chance to stop (with missile defense) one of the greatest mass murder attempts (a nuclear attack) of all time only to fail to do so? Short answer: no one.
(image: freepublic.com)
From DoD Buzz, an article on how AT&L will get more value for the money it spends on services:
One major strategy will be to change the way the department contracts for this sort of work. [Shay] Assad [director of defense pricing] said that when DoD solicits contracts for a job, even if it includes opportunities for different vendors to compete, the Pentagon often ends up getting only one bid. Going forward, DoD must try to get better deals from vendors by forcing more of them to compete to drive down the price, he argued — yes, you have heard this before. This new policy means that DoD could re-solicit contracts if officials only get one bid but they believe they can get others to force a lower cost, Assad said.
AT&L wants to use the Wal-Mart model of squeezing vendors on cost. It works for Wal-Mart, but they’re nimble, fast, and flexible and are dealing with items that are commodity-like. Also, DoD generally buys services for things it needs meaning 1) DoD doesn’t want to provide that service itself or 2) DoD can’t do it itself/isn’t good at it.
And while competition is good, another rule of thumb is you get what you pay for. Does AT&L really think that a long re-do loop of re-solicitations is going to make things better? All that will do is drag out every competition and keep money from being put on contract and expending (which for some of the work being solicited may be the real goal).
How did the faith-based desire for increased international cooperation become a foundational element of the current National Space Policy? Part of the issue is that it’s difficult to argue against cooperation, which tends to be viewed as one of those inherently good things (AKA boilerplate) that should be self-evident to all.
But when you unpack this sort of thinking, the reality emerges that cooperation is done for a purpose and too often the real purpose may be poorly understood, unarticulated, or even represent a hidden agenda. In general, space cooperation is pursued in the interest of sharing costs with others (versus going it alone) and other opportunities might be to gain insight (wink wink) into other nations’ space programs; to build (perhaps enduring) personal relationships with space leaders of other nations; or simply confidence-building measures, doing those things that reduce the chance that one’s own space programs may be viewed as threatening or adversarial.
As such, cooperation for cooperation’s sake, that is, when cooperation doesn’t somehow further the interests of the United States, would seem to serve no purpose at best and might be cross purposes with U.S. wellbeing at worst. And as we know, ‘no purpose’ has never really established itself as a compelling entering argument. Chinese space cooperation with the U.S. for the sole sake of cooperating would likewise serve no purpose. What is behind the desire for increased cooperation, that is, what are we really trying to achieve?
When a particular group of space policy experts gathers (that often code meaning they’re the ones who sponsored a particular space policy event, established the agenda, and invited the speakers) and says “recent changes within the Chinese government and industry present an opportunity for dialogue and possible technical cooperation,” the actual purpose being discussed is twofold: first, the ‘opportunity for dialogue’ and second, the ‘possible technical cooperation.’ Dialogue with China in this case is assumed to create beneficial relationships and technical cooperation is presumed to create cost sharing or cost avoidance for the United States. But just how, and in what areas, would this work?
An area where China can cooperate with the United States and Europe is in space science. Cooperative space development programs can be a key tool for moving forward these bilateral relationships, he [Ben Baseley-Walker, one of the referenced space policy experts] said.
But when it comes to U.S. space cooperation with China, fundamental questions remain: 1) how will an improved bilateral relationship with China as it regards space further the interests of the United States and 2) how will technical cooperation in space with China further the interests of the United States? It’s great to have a relationship with China that benefits the U.S. with regard to trade, buying U.S. debt, enhanced global security, furthering the ideals of Western democracies (rule of law, free markets, free elections, respect for human rights, etc.). But will space cooperation with China actually further our interests (and again, if so, how?) in these particular areas and how will such activities be perceived by others we care about in the region (to include South Korea, India, Japan, Australia, Taiwan, and even Vietnam)?
It seems reasonable to suggest that cooperation (whether regarding space, trade, defense, or whatever it may be) needs to be pursued in order to do something to further the interests of the United States and its allies. Cooperation, like trade (itself a non-coercive manifestation of cooperation), exists for a beneficial purpose. Let’s make sure the beneficial purpose (and likelihood of success) is well understood before committing the nation to simple space-based platitudes and said-to-be self-evident goodness.
Songs of Space & Nuclear War 