Chinese Hackers Disrupt U.S. Space Systems?

Why would China use cyber to disrupt U.S. space capabilities?

Because it’s cheaper, faster, and better than physical disruptions which might generate space debris, leave more evidence, and remove plausible deniability. As you may have been told, when you don’t have declared war, covert is good and overt is bad.

That’s likely why they used cyber space to disrupt U.S. space assets four times from 2007 to 2008 according to the 2011 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (starting on page 216):

• On October 20, 2007, Landsat-7, a U.S. earth observation satellite jointly managed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the U.S. Geological Survey, experienced 12 or more minutes of interference. This interference was only discovered following a similar event in July 2008.

• On June 20, 2008, Terra EOS [earth observation system] AM–1, a National Aeronautics and Space Administration-managed program for earth observation, experienced two or more minutes of interference. The responsible party achieved all steps required to command the satellite but did not issue commands.

• On July 23, 2008, Landsat-7 experienced 12 or more minutes of interference. The responsible party did not achieve all steps required to command the satellite.

• On October 22, 2008, Terra EOS AM–1 experienced nine or more minutes of interference. The responsible party achieved all steps required to command the satellite but did not issue commands.

However, these charges against China are not airtight (or vacuum tested, so to speak), but rather are strongly suggestive based on Chinese past practice and doctrine.

These events are described here not on the basis of specific attribution information but rather because the techniques appear consistent with authoritative Chinese military writings.

None of this is to say China will be giving up on direct ascent anti-satellite weapons (which also have missile defense implications), space-faring proximity operations, or the old reliable jamming and frequency interference; it’s just that cyber attacks are useful additions to the Chinese war chest, with many potential disruptive benefits.

We probably need a Code of Conduct to stop China from pursuing such activities. What’s that, you say? China doesn’t want to participate in the Code of Conduct? And the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 already addresses such events in Article IX?

…If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, it shall undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with any such activity or experiment. A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by another State Party in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, may request consultation concerning the activity or experiment.

So perhaps the U.S. requested consultations on the Chinese space/cyberwar?

Who Then, Shall Regulate Us?

Question of the moment: What if having a vibrant space program requires bypassing NASA?  

The question really means “What if having a vibrant space program requires bypassing the U.S. government as the primary space customer and space regulator?”  That’s because NASA, the Air Force, and the NRO don’t build the space hardware or provide space services, but rather, operate things that are placed in space by aerospace contractors. 

What the USG agencies do is provide “oversight” and sometimes “insight” into the myriad processes needed to get a satellite on orbit.  Similarly, the FAA tries to mitigate risk by requiring compliance with procedures, rules, regulations, and the like.

Wayne Crews, writing at Forbes, has a few excellent observations (meaning great minds think alike) on the way ahead for commercial space:

But while it’s still early in the game, we should strive to keep regulators earthbound.

Earthbound is of course a sort of space-faring metaphor for largely out-of-the-way USG oversight, insight, and risk mitigation.  Yet some regulator involvement will be required in order for commercial space providers to obtain insurance and to help build public confidence and trust in the endeavor (the effort, not the Space Shuttle Endeavor).  Without any trust in commercial space, consumers of all sorts won’t be inclined to use it.  Crews expands this idea in the second half of his article. 

More from Crews:

We’ll inevitably need to revisit the global Outer Space Treaty…

[and]

Subsidies should be discouraged…

Why?  Because if we don’t, the OST will continue to inhibit the commercial use of space and without such commercialization, space will continue to suffer the consequences of being largely dependent on government programs and subsidies. This means that space should be viewed as a frontier and not as an extraterrestrial commons (as the OST views space and do other platitudinous sayings such as ‘space reflects the common heritage of mankind’).  A frontiers mentality has a goal of making life better on earth and that’s what free-markets are best at.  Conversely, legacy government space programs have little or no interest in this area and are subject to regulatory capture.

Commercial space, in my mind, is closer to what the new space actors are doing and further from the space-tourism thing (go up to 100km, float around for a few seconds and then come home) that Branson has in mind.  New space has the opportunity to create real value for Americans (energy production and materials); space tourism is a thrill-ride for the rich (to include the USG, which is more profligate than rich). The hope many have (and remember, hope is not a strategy) is that the economies of scale brought about by space tourism will focus more people on the things a robust (and not government dependent) space economy could provide.   

Libya Practices Spacewar, Vol. 2

From SatNews.com:

Iran can do it, Ethiopia can do it, and Libya can do it.  Do what?  Practice space warfare. 

Do you think space weapons are needed for space warfare?  Not.

UAE-based Thuraya said their satellite services have been subjected to harmful and intentional interference in Libya and beyond recently.

In a statement issued on February 25th, the Company stated that it has conclusive evidence that demonstrates that the interference comes as a result of unlawful and intentional jamming activities.

Unlawful per the Outer Space Treaty which offers that states shall be responsible for national space activities (like affecting satellite signals) whether carried out by governmental or non-governmental activities; states shall be liable for damage caused by their space objects (like their ground, sea, air, or space-based interference with Thuraya’s signal), and; states shall avoid harmful contamination of space (like Thuraya’s satellite signal) and celestial bodies.

Thuraya stated that it will be looking for legal recourse, but that in the meantime, its technical teams have worked tirelessly to mitigate the impact of the interference.

By the time Thuraya issued their statement, voice services had been restored over much of the coverage area.

However the most impacted spot beams are the one that are covering Libya.

Will Libya be held responsible for this act of space warfare?  If so, wake me up when it happens.

Space Code of Conduct Backdoors Treaty Process?

‘Code’ can be used to try and create politically and militarily binding outcomes when legally binding outcomes (like treaties) can’t be mustered.

And reading between the Washington Times’ lines, there seems little doubt the government space bureaucracy has been smitten by the EU Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.

Three congressional staffers told The Washington Times that Pentagon and intelligence analysts said in a briefing Monday that the administration is looking to sign on to the European Union‘s Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.

The briefing followed the completion of an interagency review that recommends the United States sign on to the document with only a few minor changes to its language, according to two administration officials familiar with the review.

That recommendation is awaiting final approval from the National Security Council.

A senior State Department official familiar with the interagency review of the code of conduct said: "We had everyone look at this. Our defense programs are not harmed by it."

Hmmm.  ‘Not harmed by it’ is lawyer talk and it isn’t necessarily the same as enhancing U.S. national security.  Define harmed.  Define it.  Define everyone.  Explain how you came to such a conclusion.

Apparently the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which does have the power of law (although almost completely lacking the power of enforcement), is insufficient.  Similarly, non-coded space self-restraint and self-limiting behavior is inadequate and more — a code, used to create the aforementioned political and military limitations — is needed.

A draft of the code of conduct dated Sept. 27 says countries that sign on to the document vow to "refrain from any action which intends to bring about, directly or indirectly, damage or destruction of outer space objects unless such action is conducted to reduce the creation of outer space debris and/or is justified by the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the United Nations Charter or imperative safety considerations."

So would radio frequency jamming of a radio signal in outer space be considered damaging?  It would seem to be damaging to the coherency of that signal.  As such, it would appear RF jamming of a satellite’s signal to be inconsistent with the code. 

And what of the desire to minimize space debris?

"Space debris, to me, I equate it with global warming in orbit," said Matthew Hoey, a military space consultant who has worked for the U.S. government and the U.N. Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies. "It is a race against time, and once we pass the tipping point, there is no reversing it. The ramifications of a collision on economics, space exploration and communications — these are grand issues."

I think Mr. Hoey has created a world-class, no…a universal-class oxymoron: global warming in orbit. But it isn’t a good analogy regardless given the make-up-the-data-we-need story of global warming (and as a point of emphasis, space debris is a credible issue).

Mr. Hoey said the code of conduct’s emphasis on space debris is "a good thing," adding that the EU code "is a great precedent."

"It is not exactly binding," he said. "There are not exactly penalties. It is a bit of an honor system. But it’s the first step towards space-based arms control that we will eventually need."

Ah, there’s exactly where the real agenda is: arms control.  Well, the National Space Policy has already expressed its willingness for space arms control as long as it is equitable, verifiable, and in the security interest of the United States and its allies.  But how does the code compare to other space arms-control proposals?

Paula DeSutter, who was an assistant secretary of state for verification and compliance under President George W. Bush, said the EU code would be much better for U.S. national interests than a space-based arms control treaty introduced by the Russian and Chinese delegations at the 2008 U.N. Conference on Disarmament.

That proposed treaty, known as the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space Treaty (PPWT), is regarded by the Obama administration, and the Bush administration before it, as unverifiable and not in the U.S. national interest, according to public statements by both administrations.

"The code of conduct needs a few changes, but it is certainly far better than the PPWT," Ms. DeSutter said. "One of the good things about it is that it recognizes specifically the legitimate right of self-defense in space and the virtue of the U.S. satellite shootdown in 2008. It does not appear to limit U.S. missile defenses in any way."

Saying the EU’s space code of conduct is far better than the PPWT is an endorsement that lacks an anchored position.  After all, a toothache is also far better than a brain tumor, but that doesn’t make it good.

(A) congressional staff member said: "There is a suspicion that this is a slippery slope to arms control for space-based weapons, anti-satellite weapons and a back door to potentially limiting missile defense."

And that’s the biggest concern here.  Space arms control efforts have a misplaced desire to prevent the U.S. development and use of a space-based missile defense.  It always comes back to item three of the arms controller’s creed: space-based missile defense will be destabilizing. (As background, items one and two are it will never work and it costs too much).

So instead of a code of conduct, let’s hear a space arms control treaty proposal that is equitable, verifiable, and in our national interest or even better yet, come up with ways of enforcing the existing laws of the Outer Space Treaty.

Do we need a Space Code of Conduct?

Note: space objects in this illustration are cartoonishly not to scale.

Does the United States need a space code of conduct?  That’s some sort of trick question, right? Aren’t we already the most legislated country on earth?

Here’s what I think: space needs a code of conduct like Dolly Parton needs more breast augmentation.

In other words, there’s already more than enough (wait for it) guidance as it is.

Now if you want to talk about how responsible space fairing nations will enforce existing agreements (like the Outer Space Treaty), that’s another issue.

So before the world-wide space bureaucracy start slathering on additional layers of requirements, shouldn’t they first attempt to honor the requirements that already exist from the 1967 Outer Space Treaty? 

Because if we can’t get the OST to work, the real issue would seem to be that treaties themselves don’t work.  And if treaties don’t work, the only point in having them is…well, there is no point (other than self-deception).

Consider if the OST’s guidance is sufficient as written:

The use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries (from Article I).

Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in outer space in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security (from Article III).

Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space (from Article VI).

Each Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an object into outer space and each Party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object (from Article VII).

A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object while in outer space (from Article VIII).

In the use of outer space, Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty (from Article IX).

If a Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that its activity would cause potentially harmful interference, it shall undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with any such activity (still in Article IX).

A Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an activity planned by another State Party in outer space would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the use of outer space may request consultation concerning such activity (yes, still it’s from Article IX).

Arms controllers take it as an article of faith that treaties, codes, agreements, accords, pacts, and the likes will be honored.  The evidence — history — suggests otherwise.

If the world (to include the United States) has been ignoring the OST since 1967, what purpose would be served to stack on more requirements? 

Conversely, if the OST is and has been honored, aren’t its broad requirements sufficient?

Space: Think Frontier, Not Commons

Note: this article originally appeared in Air University’s The Wright Stuff.

Space: Think Frontier, Not Commons

By Mark Stout

Nations would be well served to start thinking of the space domain as more of a frontier and less as a commons.  The distinction is important: a frontier is a place that continues beyond the furthest extents of an inhabited region, while a commons is a place owned or jointly used by the members of a community.  While aspects of both the frontier and commons analogies can be argued, the frontier viewpoint is a more useful reference.  This is because considering space as a frontier is more likely to result in space policies which will allow the full development of a beneficial and robust space economy while also preserving vital national interests as they regard space.

Obfuscating the frontier – commons distinction further is the much-used phrase global commons, which has been variously applied to international