Iran’s Nuclear Program

Risk is sometimes defined as the product of capability and intent.  As risk regards a nuclear Iran, the capability is quite evident and their intent can be better understood by looking at what they do versus what they say.  Where to start?  How about at the beginning…

From Greg Jones, writing at the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center on Iran’s nuclear program(s), an article that addresses almost everything except nuclear delivery systems:

Though Iran claims that it is producing this enriched uranium for peaceful uses, all of the 3.5% enriched uranium and the 19.7% enriched uranium is just being stockpiled.

(Snip)

Iran’s stockpiles of 3.5% and 19.7% enriched uranium, its enrichment capacity of 4,600 SWU at the FEP, it [sic] ability to manufacture new centrifuges as well as its ability to transfer centrifuges from one facility to the other, all give Iran a number of options for producing the 20 kilograms of HEU required for a nuclear weapon.

And there is a two-part enrichment option which exist which could create 20kg of 90% highly enriched uranium—-a weapon’s worth–in as little as 62 days.

Only the second step of batch recycling [enrichment] might be considered a violation of safeguards but by then Iran would need only about two weeks to produce the HEU required for a nuclear weapon.

(Snip)

Further as noted above, if Iran wanted to produce a second 20 kilogram batch of 90% enriched uranium (so that it would have a total of 40 kilograms, enough for two nuclear weapons), then it would require 1,900 kilograms of 3.5% enriched uranium.  Added to the 1,735 kilograms required for the first 20 kilogram batch of 90% enriched uranium, Iran would need to produce just over 3,600 kilograms of 3.5% enriched uranium in total.  Given that Iran has already produced 2,775 kilograms of 3.5% enrich uranium and is producing about 105 kilograms, by the beginning of next year Iran will be in a position to produce two nuclear weapons worth of HEU.

(Snip)

The production of the HEU for two weapons would have to be carried out sequentially with the production of the HEU for the first weapon taking about two months (Table 2) and the production of the HEU for the second weapon taking about two and one half months (Table 3) for a total of about four and one half months.  These times should be considered the maximum since by the beginning of 2012, Iran will have produced more 19.7% enriched uranium and likely will have added even more enrichment capacity which will shorten the time required.

Two weapons could mean one for use and one held in reserve. 

So is Jones a voice in the wilderness?  Hardly, and to make the point, he compares his figures with those offered by others including Kemp and Glaser and The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).  While there is variation, when the assumptions are harmonized, the results are quite close to Jones’ 62-day estimate. 

But, but, but… what about Stuxnet the destructor?  Jones is not a believer:

Indeed during 2010 and the first part of 2011, it [Iran’s enrichment production] has significantly increased.  Again, this [Stuxnet] story appears to be nothing but more self-deception to avoid facing up to the great strides that Iran has made with its uranium enrichment program and how the time that it will take Iran to produce the HEU needed for a nuclear weapon has been steadily shrinking.

More potential self-deception is later attributed to former VJCS James Cartwright regarding the non-nuclear development for a nuclear weapon and the timeline required, which Jones ably deconstructs. 

And what about the stopping power of the atomic mall cop (observe if they’ll let you and report), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)?

The IAEA like the Pope does not have any divisions.  It does not even a police force.  By itself, it cannot take any military or law enforcement action to stop Iran or any other country from acquiring the fissile material required for nuclear weapons.  Rather, according to the IAEA “…the objective of safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material…”  [Emphasis in original]

Another weakness of the IAEA is that its reporting is unlikely to be timely enough to provide timely detection of HEU towards a military application.  But even then, so what? 

After all, the IAEA has already reported repeated violations of Iran’s safeguards agreement, including activities that indicate the development of nuclear weapons but thus far all that has been done is that the UN Security Council has passed five resolutions which in part have called for Iran to stop its uranium enrichment effort.  Iran’s rising enriched uranium production, shown in Table 1, demonstrates how ineffective these resolutions have been.

Read it (or at least read the summary) and weep?  No, read it and think about how to proceed.

You Can’t Have A Conspiracy Without A Conspiracy-Theorist

The trailing video, America Considered Nuclear Strike on Libya, is interesting in that it generally lacks context, completeness, and coherence. The major throwdown is the suggestion that the Clinton administration was considering going nuclear on Libya with a B-61 in 1997:

“It was suggested by the Pentagon [in 1997] that this weapon should be used against Libya. But in fact it was quite explicit because they said that this weapon would be available for possible use against a suspected underground chemical factory being built by Libya at Tarhunah, which is a city 60 km from Tripoli.”

Bear in mind the suggested nuclear Libyan option is from the same scholar who thinks the High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP) is an operational WMD which can change the weather, wreak havoc on power systems, rearrange the Earth’s magnetic field, and perhaps trigger earthquakes.

Warren Zevon recommends sending The Envoy

 

Space Warfare and Space Weapons

Note: this article originally appeared in Air University’s The Wright Stuff.

Space Warfare and Space Weapons

By Mark Stout

Arms control efforts, as they pertain to the space domain, often attempt to constrain, control, or manage capabilities instead of behaviors. But this focus on capabilities instead of behaviors is misplaced. Consider the modest hammer: hammering a nail is a condoned and necessary task; hammering someone’s face isn’t.

One example of misdirected concern regards the attempt to keep space from becoming “weaponized.” Ah, you ask, but just what is space weaponization? As a point of intellectual departure, the group Reaching Critical Will offers this:

Space weaponization is generally understood to refer to the placement in orbit of space-based devices that have a destructive capacity. Many experts argue that ground-based systems designed or used to attack space-based assets also constitute space weapons, though they are not technically part of the “weaponization of outer space” since they are not placed in orbit.

Space is one of the “global commons” which also include international waters, the associated sea bed and subsoil, and by some definitions, the Antarctic. The implied benefit of anti-space weapon campaigns is that those efforts will preserve the global commons of space for the benefit of all mankind. However, space weaponization–the capability–is not the driving issue. Rather, the concern is the behaviors–space warfare.

Space warfare is the process of military struggle regarding information that’s delivered in, to, through, or from the space domain, and it can happen with or without space weaponization. While space weaponization gets all the headlines, it’s really a subset of space warfare which is both more common and more significant.

Space warfare is characterized by purposeful behaviors which affect the delivery and availability of space domain products and services. As such, space warfare is concerned with the behaviors that are used to create particular outcomes. Space warfare might affect a space capability in a temporary and reversible manner, or as with a kinetic anti-satellite attack, it might be permanent and irreversible.

The ability to conduct space warfare has become a pragmatic necessity for U.S. adversaries, and by extension, for the United States and its allies. However unlike Clausewitz’s definition of war, space warfare — as with cyber warfare — is generally going to be (but is not limited to) an act lacking physical force. Space warfare, even when it employs temporary and reversible methods, can still be used to compel an enemy to do our will.

If someone intentionally jams a GPS or communications signal, the event doesn’t entail a weapon in space, but the intent and effect created is that of space warfare. Similarly, if an intelligence community spacecraft is laser-dazzled for the purpose of affecting its ability to gather information, this too is an act of space warfare.

Finally, a satellite is just an information gathering and disseminating device until it runs into someone else’s satellite. At that point — depending on the intent of those controlling the satellite — it is at minimum a space debris dispenser or even a de facto space war machine. “Ramming speed,” to borrow from Ben-Hur, is easily enough achieved in space when objects are travelling in a nominal low earth orbit at seven kilometers per second.

In all of these examples, space warfare is being purposefully used to deprive users of space domain delivered information. So why is it space weaponization and not space warfare is the issue that warrants so much of the arms controller’s attentions?

The most compelling hypothesis is the anti-space weapon campaigns are largely an attempt to pre-empt space-based missile defense. Space-based missile defense would be exceedingly useful in countering attacking ICBMs before those ICBMs deploy countermeasures which can confuse and overwhelm defensive efforts. But why would anyone want to stop incoming ICBMs which would almost certainly be loaded with weapons of mass destruction, even if it requires the use of (gasp!) “space weapons”?

Beyond consulting Freud, it may be because space-based missile defense upsets the arms control community’s sense of balance. This desire for balance often has the enduring and overarching goals of stability and equitability. Unfortunately, the results are security policies which support a stable “balance of nuclear terror” with a fair and equitable “mutually assured destruction.”

Space warfare, whether it includes space weapons or not, is merely a political act; a Clausewitzian extension of competing terrestrial wills between political bodies. As such, to prevent space warfare — or space weapons — one must prevent earth warfare and earth weapons, propositions which have eluded mankind for some time.

It’s been said the three stages of innovation are: 1) it’ll never work; 2) it’ll cost too much; and 3) I can’t believe we weren’t doing this before. As peace has yet burst out all across the global commons, let’s start working more on addressing behaviors like space warfare and less on often misnamed capabilities like “space weapons.” To modernize and again borrow from Ben-Hur, let us keep our space warfare shields ready and our swords bright as we ponder a future that includes space-based “weapons.”

Mark Stout is a researcher and analyst at the Air Force Space and Cyber Strategy Center and administers its unofficial blog Songs of Space and Nuclear War. The opinions expressed here are those of the author alone and may not reflect the views and policies of the US Air Force or the Department of Defense.

Power Failure Shuts Down Squadron of Nuclear Missiles?

The Atlantic reports

…a power failure at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming that took 50 nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), one-ninth of the U.S. missile stockpile, temporarily offline on Saturday.

How serious – or better said, how weird – is this whole event?  First off, part of the story is mangled, because power failures don’t take sorties off line—that’s what back-up AC power and batteries are for and these systems have those capabilities.  Still, the Chairman, SecDef and the President were all briefed.

Tell me the last time the President was briefed on an ICBM event.  Maybe Reagan with Peacekeeper activation, circa 1987?

On Saturday morning, according to people briefed on what happened, a squadron of ICBMs suddenly dropped down into what’s known as “LF Down” status, meaning that the missileers in their bunkers could no longer communicate with the missiles themselves. LF Down status also means that various security protocols built into the missile delivery system, like intrusion alarms and warhead separation alarms, were offline.

The deal with LF Down is that the sorties status is unknown.  You don’t know if sortie is responding to commands or not.  You don’t know if it’s secure or not.  You’re not getting any status.  But again, some story mangling – remember, the first report from the field is always wrong — is going on here as it was (and in a moment, will be) described as a power failure:

An Air Force spokesperson, Christy Nolta, said the power failure lasted less than an hour. “There was a temporary interruption and the missiles themselves were always protected by multiple, redundant, safety, security and command and control features. At no time was there any danger to the public,” she said.

OK.  Pick one.  Is it a power failure or LF Down?  There’s a big difference.  Sorties lose commercial power all the time.

The cause of the failure remains unknown, although it is suspected to be a breach of underground cables deep beneath the base, according to a senior military official.

It is next to impossible for these systems to be hacked, so the military does not believe the incident was caused by malicious actors. A half dozen individual silos were affected by Saturday’s failure.

Ack.  A cable breach of some sort?  My guess would be some sort of crypto and synchronization fault.  Or human error, like someone in a launch control center popped the wrong drawer (with power still applied) and then freaked out and reseated it (with power still applied).  And a half-dozen silos?  Is it six or is it a whole squadron worth, that is, 50.

An administration official said that “to make too much out of this would be to sensationalize it. It’s not that big of a deal. Everything worked as planned.”

Er, no.  When fifty sorties drop, things aren’t working as planned.

This gets back to the age of the ICBM infrastructure, which is now pushing fifty years old.  The missiles, the operating system, and the warheads have all been refurbished, remanufactured, and modernized through the years.  The infrastructure, not so much.

National Journal’s Megan Scully contacted a spokesperson for Sen. Jon Kyl, a top GOP critic of START, who said that “We don’t know what happened and why.”  The spokesperson refused to comment on “media reports.”

“We don’t know what happened and why,” is the reality of the situation.

No Ticket, No Nukes

Bob Dylan told us the pump won’t work ‘cause the vandals took the handles.

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Hugh Shelton, in his recently released memoirs, said America couldn’t have used its nuclear weapons because then-President Bill Clinton lost the presidential identification codes.

So to channel Dylan, the nukes won’t go ‘cause the President went all negligent?

The crypto in question would be the President’s personal identifier (and not the “football”), known in the vernacular as the “biscuit.”

This guy says (in effect) ‘I believe Shelton’s lying, because the described scenario is implausible.’

Read a completely plausible scenario at The Atlantic.

And remember don’t follow leaders (who) watch the parkin’ meters.

No Nukes Requires a New World Order (Updated With Added Links)

The military has a tradition, observed more now than in the past, of putting the bottom line up front.  Here is the bottom line, which comes from the last paragraph of Fred Kaplan’s recent article on new START (and on nuclear weapons in general):

Like arms treaties of an earlier era, the accord’s main benefit is as a forum for cooperative diplomacy and, through its elaborate inspection procedures, a means for both sides to build — and verify — trust. Truly dramatic reductions in nuclear arsenals may have to be preceded by truly dramatic changes in world politics.

Yes, the idea behind a treaty is all about activities that are in one’s enduringly-best interest to begin with.  So does new START pass this test or not?  Does new START make America more or less secure and does it serve or disserve our enduring interests?

We don’t distrust the UK or France because they have nuclear weapons.  That’s because we understand their intent and their enduring interests.  But compared to the UK and France, we trust Russia less, China less still, and Iran and North Korea almost none.

Either or both the U.S. and Russia could move towards the requirements proposed in new START right now without any sort of treaty.  But if each could proceed unilaterally, why don’t they?  Such inaction would suggest–all other things being equal—nuclear weapons and associated deliver systems actually make each feel more secure.

Kaplan also writes:

It takes two-thirds of the Senate to ratify a treaty, which is why in this political climate — despite endorsements from dozens of generals and national-security officials — passage is no sure thing.

The call to submit to new START because of the authorities mentioned (as well as here), is torturous.  Are the new START endorsements being made because the general officers and security officials somehow understand Russia’s intent better than others?  Any endorsements from general officers should be taken with a grain of salt.  Those still in the uniform are under political pressure to support and those who are retired may carry a nuclear chip on their shoulders, that is, back in the Cold War days nuclear systems may have taken money from their own preferred service, branch, specialty, or preferred program.  What about the motives of the “national-security officials”?  You could write a book on that.  A first motive might be an individual’s legacy and consider, for example, the actions of Sandy Berger.

Why do we have the number of nuclear weapons and delivery system we now have? U.S. STRATCOM uses a ratio, which Kaplan critiques,

Stratcom reasons that this ratio is necessary to ensure that each weapon meets its required “probability of arrival.” But what is this probability? Who came up with this requirement? Are this ratio and this requirement really necessary to deter nuclear war? Or, if nuclear war were to break out, would this ratio improve our chances of “winning,” whatever that means?

Starting with the “winning” idea, no one in the nuclear business talks of winning a nuclear war.  Still, in a post-nuclear world, most of us can agree there are some conditions that would be preferred for the U.S. to be in and there are others which would be much less desirable.  But no one ever talks of winning.

Regarding the weapons count and the requirements and probability numbers, this is much more about human nature than it is about warfighting.  How much money does LeBron James, Bill Gates, or Warren Buffet need to make to feel secure?

I’m generally appreciative of the tone and content of Kaplan’s article and speaking for myself, I’m new START agnostic.  However, it’s the sense of a new START cram-down that bothers me, the artificial time lines and sense of unnecessary urgency.  I feel the Senate should take the time it needs to come to closure on the issues therein and then using their best judgment, either accept or reject it.

It’s Six Minutes Until Midnight: Do You Know Where Your Children Are?

The article It’s Six Minutes Until Midnight: Do You Know Where Your Children Are? originally appeared in the 12 August 2010 version of Air University’s The Wright Stuff.

Can You Take Calls For Nuclear Disarmament Seriously Without Serious Arguments?

Seriously?

The article Taking disarmament seriously, as with many arms control advocacy pieces, presumes what it sets out to prove.

That doesn’t work for me.  I can’t take disarmament arguments seriously without serious arguments.  Arms controllers tend to be full of “we gotta” while ignoring the “and here’s how we’re gonna” part.

So in the “we gotta” regard, the article attempts to build a sense of crisis regarding nuclear war while attributing the lack of nuclear war to luck, which, sans evidence, is a hard thing to do.  The “we gotta” also always assumes the efficacy of arms control treaties.

Former Dictator Not Dead Yet

Fidel Castro, once Cuba’s chief judge, jury, and executioner, made an appearance on Cuban television.

Was it real or was it avatarded?  It was real, but does it matter?

Castro pontificated on the middle east, nuclear war, and the United States. His intent was likely to show that he’s not dead yet and to support his fellow travelers in Iran and North Korea.

Where’s the International Criminal Court when you need it?  Probably out writing parking tickets or eating donuts.

Nixon Planned Nuclear Strike On North Korea

The Telegraph says that President Nixon planned a nuclear strike on North Korea in 1969.

Big deal.  The United States has planned for nuclear war with our adversaries since 1945…and I am willing to bet we still do.

Many people plan to lose weight, write a will, exercise regularly, and quit smoking.  Often there are disconnects between planning and doing sometimes for good reasons but often not.

If the axiom failing to plan is planning to fail holds true, Nixon’s planning was reasonable and prudent.