Life At Secret Iranian Facilities Is Risky Business

It seems if you work at one of the secret Iranian facilities associated with the nuclear weapons program or the ballistic missile effort, life is fraught with risk. Stuxnet, Revolutionary Guard mishaps, what’s next?

Oh, another mishap. Wonder how many are dead this time?

An explosion rocked the western Iranian city of Isfahan on Monday, the semi-official Fars news agency reported, adding that the blast was heard in several parts of the city.

(snip)

The reported incident occurred about two weeks after Gen. Hasan Tehrani Moghaddam was killed together with 20 other Guard members Nov. 12 at a military site outside Bidganeh village, 40 kilometers southwest of Tehran.

The Revolutionary Guard said the accidental explosion occurred while military personnel were transporting munitions.

Who to blame? Should Iran finger Stuxnet, Part Deux? The Russians or North Koreans (with their traditional quality control “challenges”)? The rocket scientists associated with the Revolutionary Guard? The Protocols of the Zionistic Sons of Katie Elder? All the above?

If it was Israel, look out: 150,000 rockets are headed their way, under the command of the winner of the Ming the Merciless look-alike contest.

 

 

Secret Revolutionary Guard Training Facility Discovered

It seems there’s new evidence regarding the secret training school associated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s missile program. Wikileaks got nuthin’ on Songs of Space and Nuclear War (and you still can’t spell Assange without a-s-s).

Iranian Missile Test Kills 20-plus Iranians; Russia Rattles Its Nuclear Saber WRT U.S. Missile Defense

It appears Iran killed at least 20 of its own in a secret missile test, including Revolutionary Guard Gen. Hasan Moghaddam. Details surrounding the disaster are not well known.

Given the observed outcome, all I can advise is this: keep working boys, keep working. You’ll know you’re fully successful when you’re all dead.

Of course, over time, practice makes perfect, especially when Iran is likely to be getting a fair amount of outside help.

In other news related to the foreign policy success of the so-called Russian Reset comes this from NTI:

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on Wednesday said his nation would target U.S. antimissile installations if the two nations cannot come to accord on the Obama administration’s missile defense plans, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Nov. 22).

The United States and NATO for the last year have sought to reach agreement with Moscow for collaboration on a developing Europe-based missile shield. Several rounds of negotiations have failed to produce a deal, with the sides remaining at odds over the set-up of a cooperative defense system.

The Kremlin has also demanded a legally binding pledge that the NATO defenses would not be aimed at Russian nuclear forces. The alliance has rebuffed the request but says the missile shield is intended to counter ballistic missile strikes from the Middle East, notably Iran.

Medvedev said that should the dispute continue Russia was prepared to deploy Iskander missiles in the far-western Kaliningrad region that could be fired at U.S. missile defense facilities in Europe. Additional missiles could be placed in the west and south of Russia, he added.

New long-range nuclear missiles would be equipped with technology enabling them to defeat antimissile systems, Medvedev said.

There is a potential upside to U.S. national security embedded within Medvedev’s threats:

The president also said that Russia could suspend participation in the New START nuclear arms control treaty with the United States and curb additional arms control discussions with Washington.

"The United States and its NATO partners as of now aren’t going to take our concerns about the European missile defense into account," according to Medvedev.

With security partners like Russia, who needs non-partners?

Iran Fails To Dominate Space

Iran, who can’t manage to assassinate a Saudi diplomat, can’t get it done in space either. Maybe there’s hope yet regarding their nuclear program?

Just what do I mean? Well, Iran has admitted their recent space monkey launch (what else could it be called?) failed.

Sometimes this is referred to as “not meeting all objectives,” other times it comes out as a “non-nominal” effort.

The way ahead suggests that unless the Russians or Chinese do some heavy space lifting on Iran’s behalf, Iran putting a man in space by 2021 may be a success-oriented schedule.

And where’s PETA when you need ‘em?

Leading From Behind Or Leading From The Shadows?

The Daily Beast offers up this:

The U.S. military has spent about $1 billion so far and played a far larger role in Libya than it has acknowledged, quietly implementing an emerging "covert intervention" strategy that the Obama administration hopes will let America fight small wars with a barely detectable footprint.

$1 billion so far would be the incremental cost of the mission.  “Sunk” costs (personnel, ships, warplanes, etc.) cannot possibly be a part of the tally.  And the “covert intervention” strategy collapses under a bit of scrutiny as well.

Officially, President Obama handed the lead role of ousting Muammar Gaddafi to the European members of NATO. For this he was criticized by Washington war hawks who suggested that Europeans working with a ragtag team of Libyan rebels was a recipe for stalemate, not victory.

But behind the scenes, the U.S. military played an indispensable role in the Libya campaign, deploying far more forces than the administration chose to advertise.

If true, what would be the purpose of understating the scope (and especially the profile) of U.S. participation?  To enhance the self-esteem of NATO or the participating gulf nations?   

Actually, the Administration’s purpose of understating the scope and profile (the “covert intervention” strategy) is likely to be pure domestic politics.  Otherwise, overthrowing an evil and threatening dictator in oil rich Libya in 2011 is little different than overthrowing an evil and threatening Saddam Hussein in oil rich Iraq in 2003 (except the 2003 war was authorized by the U.S. Congress). 

Iranian Lawfare? Disinformation Campaign? Distraction Ops? Something else?

Iran had a deal with Russia to buy approximately $800 million worth of S-300 ground-to-air missiles.  The deal has subsequently been canx’d, attributed to the Iranian sanctions.  What’s Iran to do?  Lawfare!

Iran’s ambassador to Moscow, Mahmoud Reza Sajjadi, announced on Aug. 24 that Tehran had lodged a complaint against Russia with an international court of arbitration, Russian news agencies reported.

(Snip)

Russia’s state news agency RIA Novosti, quoting Sajjadi, said Iran had filed the complaint nearly half a year ago.

So why’s the issue being brought to light just now?  Perhaps it’s some sort of disinformation campaign to move the focus off the Russian agreement to deal Iran yet more nuclear capability.

Or perhaps the S-300 wasn’t all it was cracked up to be?  That is, the Russians didn’t want to sell something which had great foreign military sales potential only to have it defeated/bypassed by Israel in real-world conflict?

Iran’s Nuclear Program

Risk is sometimes defined as the product of capability and intent.  As risk regards a nuclear Iran, the capability is quite evident and their intent can be better understood by looking at what they do versus what they say.  Where to start?  How about at the beginning…

From Greg Jones, writing at the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center on Iran’s nuclear program(s), an article that addresses almost everything except nuclear delivery systems:

Though Iran claims that it is producing this enriched uranium for peaceful uses, all of the 3.5% enriched uranium and the 19.7% enriched uranium is just being stockpiled.

(Snip)

Iran’s stockpiles of 3.5% and 19.7% enriched uranium, its enrichment capacity of 4,600 SWU at the FEP, it [sic] ability to manufacture new centrifuges as well as its ability to transfer centrifuges from one facility to the other, all give Iran a number of options for producing the 20 kilograms of HEU required for a nuclear weapon.

And there is a two-part enrichment option which exist which could create 20kg of 90% highly enriched uranium—-a weapon’s worth–in as little as 62 days.

Only the second step of batch recycling [enrichment] might be considered a violation of safeguards but by then Iran would need only about two weeks to produce the HEU required for a nuclear weapon.

(Snip)

Further as noted above, if Iran wanted to produce a second 20 kilogram batch of 90% enriched uranium (so that it would have a total of 40 kilograms, enough for two nuclear weapons), then it would require 1,900 kilograms of 3.5% enriched uranium.  Added to the 1,735 kilograms required for the first 20 kilogram batch of 90% enriched uranium, Iran would need to produce just over 3,600 kilograms of 3.5% enriched uranium in total.  Given that Iran has already produced 2,775 kilograms of 3.5% enrich uranium and is producing about 105 kilograms, by the beginning of next year Iran will be in a position to produce two nuclear weapons worth of HEU.

(Snip)

The production of the HEU for two weapons would have to be carried out sequentially with the production of the HEU for the first weapon taking about two months (Table 2) and the production of the HEU for the second weapon taking about two and one half months (Table 3) for a total of about four and one half months.  These times should be considered the maximum since by the beginning of 2012, Iran will have produced more 19.7% enriched uranium and likely will have added even more enrichment capacity which will shorten the time required.

Two weapons could mean one for use and one held in reserve. 

So is Jones a voice in the wilderness?  Hardly, and to make the point, he compares his figures with those offered by others including Kemp and Glaser and The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).  While there is variation, when the assumptions are harmonized, the results are quite close to Jones’ 62-day estimate. 

But, but, but… what about Stuxnet the destructor?  Jones is not a believer:

Indeed during 2010 and the first part of 2011, it [Iran’s enrichment production] has significantly increased.  Again, this [Stuxnet] story appears to be nothing but more self-deception to avoid facing up to the great strides that Iran has made with its uranium enrichment program and how the time that it will take Iran to produce the HEU needed for a nuclear weapon has been steadily shrinking.

More potential self-deception is later attributed to former VJCS James Cartwright regarding the non-nuclear development for a nuclear weapon and the timeline required, which Jones ably deconstructs. 

And what about the stopping power of the atomic mall cop (observe if they’ll let you and report), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)?

The IAEA like the Pope does not have any divisions.  It does not even a police force.  By itself, it cannot take any military or law enforcement action to stop Iran or any other country from acquiring the fissile material required for nuclear weapons.  Rather, according to the IAEA “…the objective of safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material…”  [Emphasis in original]

Another weakness of the IAEA is that its reporting is unlikely to be timely enough to provide timely detection of HEU towards a military application.  But even then, so what? 

After all, the IAEA has already reported repeated violations of Iran’s safeguards agreement, including activities that indicate the development of nuclear weapons but thus far all that has been done is that the UN Security Council has passed five resolutions which in part have called for Iran to stop its uranium enrichment effort.  Iran’s rising enriched uranium production, shown in Table 1, demonstrates how ineffective these resolutions have been.

Read it (or at least read the summary) and weep?  No, read it and think about how to proceed.

Iran Says It Will Send A Satellite To Geo

When the Iranian Students’ News Agency says that Iran is going to place an indigenous satellite in geo-synchronous orbit, we need to raise the global warming climate change climate chaos flag.  Xinhuanet.com provides a bit more clarity saying the launch will be done “in the near future.”

I suppose this all comes down to how you define ‘in the near future.’  But let me offer a very brief bit of advice on this: don’t hold your breath. 

Iran is much more interested in space launch that looks like ballistic missile testing than it is in developing the big boosters (and upper stages) needed to get to geo, even for relatively modest geo-using payloads.  And doing this in the near future?  Pure propaganda pap.

Or… (Begin sarcasm font) could this reflect a profound Iranian breakthrough in propulsion? (Close sarcasm font)

Russian Reset and Quid Pro Quo

The Russian reset has never been anything but a quid pro quo deal: they get something they want (a national-level ego stroke by the U.S. plus cash) for addressing Afghanistan resupply issues and in buying renting another voice (pretty much) favoring Iranian nuclear containment.  The administration claims a foreign policy victory (photo op, New START, non-proliferation, needed logistical access to Afghanistan, etc.) even as the U.S. national security benefits of the treaty are non-existent. 

Now, the whole reset deal may go off the rails.  Why?  Because the Russian leaders may have their feelings hurt if the United States passes a law criticizing Russian human rights violations and taking action against those complicit in such crimes. 

Think the law will ever be passed?  Me neither.

How Iran Will Defeat Sanctions

If what ft.com (registration required) is reporting is correct, Iran may backdoor sanctions by bartering with (wait for it) China.

…China is dominant in Iranian business and could use a barter system to balance trade between the two countries. Beijing is involved in everything from building tunnels to exporting toys and has been expanding into Iran’s oil sector, where European companies such as Shell and Total have been deterred by the difficulties of operating without contravening sanctions.

China and Iran’s bilateral trade totalled $29.3bn last year, up almost 40 per cent from 2009. The two countries this month signed several infrastructure and trade collaboration agreements that would see Chinese companies invest in big infrastructure projects in Iran, while Iran would export large quantities of chrome ore to China, according to local reports.

Why is China doing this?  Possible answers include (but are not limited to) 1) because they value the oil Iran provides above all, 2) because they have to do something with the army of engineers and scientists they’re pumping out each year, 3) because they don’t really want Iranian sanctions to work, and 4) because they can.

(image: mydailyclarity)