U.S. Nuclear Forensics Skill Is Declining

Seeing Is Believing

Having the ability to attribute the characteristics of a particular nuclear weapon to a specific country is an exceedingly useful ability in responding appropriately.

For example, if a dirty bomb goes off in Tel Aviv, it’s one thing to suspect that Tehran gave Hezbollah the materials for the bomb.  It’s another to know they did it based on the nuclear fingerprints associated with the weapon.

The inability to attribute events in cyberspace back to a particular geographical point, individual, or group, has long been identified as a weakness of cyber defense.  The inability to assign attribution with a nuclear event would perhaps be a failure with an orders of magnitude greater effect.

Nuclear forensics skills, which are said to be in decline, have to be one of the most important capabilities the U.S. can fully develop. Maintaining such expertise is a vital part of deterrence.

Attack of the Zeros

Foreign Policy has an interesting article that spans much of the spectrum regarding the current nuclear state-of-play.  New START, Nuclear Policy Review, and Proliferation?  Check, check, and check.

The article kicks things off with a short critique of the flick Nuclear Tipping Point which James Traub describes as “an old-fashioned eye-glazer” and features the fab four of arms control (Sam Nunn, William Perry, George Shultz, and Henry Kissinger) “speaking against a black background while portentous kettledrums thump offstage.”

These four are the face of the Nuclear Security Project, “an effort to galvanize global action to reduce urgent nuclear dangers and build support for reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, ultimately ending them as a threat to the world.”

Their web pages asks ‘what if Al Qaeda gets a nuclear weapon?’

The answer: all of our time and efforts on new START have been grossly and pathetically misplaced.

Ah but back to the article.  In time, the issue of bilateral nuclear disarmament as a precondition to the endstate of achieving a world without nuclear weapons is addressed.  The answer, coming from an administration arms-controller: These (that is, unilateral or bilateral disarmament) are propositions that have to be demonstrated.”

Well said.

Non-kudos for the implication that the U.S. has nuclear bombers still on alert. We haven’t had that condition for almost 20 years.

Medvedev Warns of Iranian Ability To Go Nuclear

When a political leader says something that’s true but inconvenient, or is substantively different from an earlier position, that’s a good time to pay attention.

So when Medvedev says Iran isn’t too far from building a nuclear bomb, Iran’s near-nuclear status has become an obvious truth.

The New Nuclear Atheists

This article originally appeared in Air University’s The Wright Stuff.

A Nuclear Apologist on the Nuclear Atheists

By Mark Stout

Perhaps you’ve heard from the Harvard Business Review or some other such weighty source that “the best way to predict the future is to create it.”  Such advice sounds great until you consider that failure is a startlingly common outcome associated with creation.  For example, about half of all new businesses fail within five years despite the fact all were no doubt constructed to create better futures for their proprietors and seemed like a good idea at the time.  Yes, reality can have a way of intruding on the best laid plans.  Consider, for example, the bold and innovative organic jelly fish farmer.  When it turns out there’s no market for organic jelly fish, all the farmer’s attempts to ‘create the future’ have been a waste of time and money.

I bring the ‘create the future’ concept forward as a point of departure to discuss those who want to ‘create’ a world without nuclear weapons.  As with organic jelly fish farming, while theoretically do-able, a world without nuclear weapons requires you to suspend your belief in some historically grounded and self-evident obstacles which will be unpacked in short order.  Those who would attempt to create a world without nuclear weapons are individuals and organizations can be described as nuclear atheists and are epitomized by the kind of thinking seen in the article Reaching Zero.

They are nuclear atheists, not because they don’t believe in the existence of such weapons, but rather because they do not believe there is a security value or usefulness associated with nuclear weapons.  This position asserts that the existence (not the use, the existence) of nuclear weapons is effectively a global suicide pact.  Unfortunately, the nuclear atheists’ arguments seem to assume what they purport to prove.

Acknowledged or not, the nuclear atheists, in advocating for a world without nuclear weapons, believes in an ahistorical humanity that would today require the creation of 1) cheat-free universal and simultaneous nuclear disarming enabled by 2) an inviolate and enduringly unified international community which would 3) effectively uninvent the past by controlling the knowledge and manufacturing skills needed to create nuclear weapons.

The past instead shows us that cheating does occur, whether it is simultaneous or unsynchronized, individual or institutional, or whether it regards trade or treaties.  Next, the phrase ‘enduringly unified international community’ is itself an amusing, but ultimately useless, oxymoron.  Finally, nothing has ever been uninvented.  Together, this means the future proposed by the nuclear atheists for a world without nuclear weapons is beyond implausible.  In keeping with the deity theme, a world without nuclear weapons will only happen when the lion lies down with the lamb.

The nuclear atheists–who are sometimes referred to as global zeros or nuclear abolitionists–look at the world largely by contrasting the bygone Cold War with our current post-Cold War environment.  Some nuclear atheists even grudgingly accept that since the Soviet Union had nuclear weapons which threatened America’s existence, then the U.S. needed similar weapons.  But the fall-back is often ‘but we’re not in the 1950s anymore.’  Well no kidding–we’re not even in 2009 anymore.

Of course the Cold War has passed and nuclear apologists–those who feel nuclear weapons can add to U.S. national security and global stability–as well as nuclear atheists know it.  Nuclear proliferation is now the issue de jour and the challenge is to address exactly to do next.  This is because there are now more nuclear states–and more states interested in becoming nuclear states–than there have ever been.

Nuclear atheists see the United States’ superior conventional capabilities and use those capabilities as part of their argument for eliminating U.S. nuclear weapons.  However, this Western-focused worldview ignores the reality that our conventional superiority–versus our nuclear superiority–is what makes others covet nuclear weapons.  Nuclear weapons are inherently asymmetrical, so unless a nation falls under the U.S. provided security, they will be very highly valued by nuclear have-nots.  The lessons some learned from the first and second Gulf Wars were those of two-way nuclear deterrence: being nuclear could well keep you from having to fight the U.S. or its allies conventionally.  The ‘peace and security’ Iraq twice ‘gained’ by not having nuclear weapons instead destined them to full-on and unambiguous conventional defeat.

The nuclear atheists often fall back on the intellectual efforts presented by Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Sam Nunn and Bill Perry.  However in January 2010, these four offered that while international cooperation to prevent proliferation or a loss of nuclear materials is exceedingly important, “Providing for this nation’s defense will always take precedence over all other priorities.” This is where the nuclear atheists are most disconnected: they have a goal but no reasonable strategy or plan of action to take them to their endstate.  Goals minus strategy equal fantasy and fantasy tends to make for lousy national security.

Statesmen like Kissinger, Shultz, Nunn, and Perry have a preeminent goal of sustaining or enhancing the nation’s security and nuclear deterrence will be a part of the equation for decades, and if former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger is correct, perhaps for perpetuity.  The nuclear atheists say Schlesinger, reflect “…a combination of American utopianism and American parochialism…[which is]…not based upon an understanding of reality.”

Is there any irony in the fact that nuclear atheists depend on a whole series of miracles to achieve a world without nuclear weapons?  The nuclear atheists would be better served by reconsidering historical events, quitting their attempts to create a crisis where none exists (arms control with Russia), and paying more attention to the one that does exist (Iran).  And as for me, I am a nuclear apologetic (and even a nuclear reductionist) who will work to create a world without reality television, another of life’s great oxymorons.

Mark Stout is a researcher and analyst at Air University’s National Space Studies Center and sometimes posts at the blog Songs of Space and Nuclear War.  The opinions expressed here are those of the author alone and may not reflect the views and policies of the US Air Force or the Department of Defense.

Nuclear Healing?

Air Force Material Command passed the Kirtland AFB, NM unit which had failed an NSI in November 2009 and in January 2010 was decertified.

While the inspection may have been “unannounced” it would have been far from unexpected.

Laser-Enriched Uranium?

LEU normally stands for low-enriched uranium.

Could it soon stand for laser-enriched uranium?

The Mathematics of Nuclear Deterrence

Air University authors Gary Schaub and Jim Forsyth say the U.S. needs to unilaterally strip down to a nuclear arsenal of 311 weapons.

Not 312, not 310: 311.

The breakdown is 100 single-warhead ICBMs; 192 single-warhead sea-launched ballistic missiles, and 19 B-2s each carrying one single-warhead air-launched cruise missile.

As an area code, 311 sounds pretty reasonable.  As a weapons count, not so much.  Consider the following:

• In the summer of 2009, Deputy Joint Chiefs Chairman General James Cartwright testified 860 nuclear launchers was the bare minimum.  ’New’ START goes below that at 800 launchers with 1550 strategic nuclear weapons.  311 is obviously well below new START.
• The U.S. provides a ‘nuclear umbrella’ to a number of other countries.  It isn’t clear how or if this is considered in the 311 weapons count.  For comparison, who falls under the Russian and Chinese ‘nuclear umbrella’?  That would be Russia and China.
• What about tactical nuclear weapons?  The U.S. would go to zero based on the authors’ recommendations.  As such, any U.S. nuclear weapons provided to NATO would go away.  Could Russia’s 2000 or so tactical nukes place U.S. allies and interests at risk?

There is no mathematical solution to this issue; conditions change and we’re dealing with deterrence. Weapons system reliability, survivability, modernization, defenses, and the likes are in the details and the details matter greatly.  Deterrence isn’t science, it’s strategy and as a strategy, it is by nature less than completely precise.

Really all the U.S. needs is one weapon.  Unfortunately, it doesn’t yet exist, but to get things started, we’ll call it the “Assured Nuclear Weapon Defeat Weapon” (ANWDW, pronounced ah-new-we-do).  It is 100% reliable and 100% available.

Then we can go to zero nuclear weapons.

The Tactical versus Strategic Distinction: It’s A Big Deal, Right?

Note: this article originally appeared in Air University’s The Wright Stuff

The Tactical versus Strategic Distinction: It’s A Big Deal, Right?

By Mark Stout

While the wise old owl discovered it took three licks to get to the Tootsie Roll center of a Tootsie Roll Pop, students of national security might wonder about the arithmetic of nuclear deterrence.  For example, how many tactical nuclear weapons does it takes to equal a strategic nuclear weapon?

An apples-to-apples comparison is fine if you’re discussing apples, but nuclear weapons are but one part of the grand and cumulative smorgasbord

Thinking Through Nuclear Security

Thinking Through Nuclear Security

By Mark Stout

Note: this article originally appeared in the 15 April 2010 edition of Air University’s The Wright Stuff.

While nuclear weapons are not our future, they are in our future and will be for a very long time.  Nuclear weapons–ours and others–will go away when their value is at or approaches zero, which is unlikely unless  these weapons  are: a)  rendered obsolete by defensive nuclear weapons technology—technology that has yet  to fully emerge—that makes offensive nuclear attacks impotent; or are b) superseded by superior weapons, neither of which are on the horizon.   If today’s nuclear weapons are overcome by some yet-to-be determined technology, it may mean even more terrifying (chemical or biological?) or powerful (cyber or directed energy?) weapons have become available, or because we’ve succeeded in making the world safe for full-on conventional war.

What Would Rickover Do?

This article originally appeared in Air University’s The Wright Stuff

What Would Rickover Do?

by

Mark Stout & Larry Chandler

Admiral Hyman Rickover was quite a man.  Considered the Father of the nuclear Navy, he was a man of action, served an inconceivable 60+plus years of continuous active duty (not a typo), and was highly demanding of himself and others. Unaccepting of the Navy’s traditional methods, Rickover instead chose to build a world-class organization of his own terms. Sometimes this meant taking his programs directly to Congress, a behavior that earned Rickover enemies outside, but especially within the Navy.  Conversely, his naked pursuit of excellence, including nuclear safety, surety, and stewardship, and hisprogrammatic salesmanship also helped cultivate a large portfolio of friends and admirers.  It has been Rickover’s accomplishments–his major and enduring impact on the nuclear Navy–that have created and sustained an interest in his opinions and ideas.

In a 1982 speech Rickover made at Columbia University that served to culminate much of his thinking, three major actors emerge: the individual, the leader, and the organization.  These are then knit together by an overarching Rickover theme regarding the importance of knowledgeable leaders, individual responsibility and the tendency of large government organizations to dilute individual responsibility.  Both the actors and the theme are relevant, first because of Rickover’s nuclear background and ideas relate directly to current Air Force efforts to “revitalize” its nuclear enterprise, but also because of the transcendent nature of his thoughts.  Most of Rickover’s Columbia speech text is at govleaders.org.

The Individual

Rickover felt each individual needed to feel a sense of ownership and have a corresponding sense of loyalty for high achievement to occur.  Ultimately, individuals accomplish things and to do so, they need to possess competence, continuity, and commitment. When an individual has direct personal involvement in an endeavor’s success or failure (and when they know it), Rickover felt superior performance was much more likely to occur.  Conversely, poor performance is more likely when responsibilities are unclear.  Similarly, when an individual’s responsibility and their authority are generalized, unexceptional (or worse) performance can be expected.

However, without individuals doing the right things, organizations fail.  While this is self-evident to most of us, it is a lesson worth considering in prioritization, because Rickover suggests a general human tendency towards performing ‘little tasks’ (which may be interesting, or even urgent, but are ultimately unimportant).  And why is this so?  He suggests human nature often nudges us towards the sorts of “challenges” that really require little effort or energy, but still seem to provide some sort of internal sense of accomplishment.  If less important things are being pursued, even if they are being done well, the individual will fail to accomplish the organization’s mission.

The Leader

Rickover knew leaders had to have more than symbolic value.  That is, an organization’s leaders needed to go beyond vaguely being “in-charge” or replying “I’m the commander” when asked “What do you do?”  Rickover warned against generalist-leaders, “often unskilled in the technical aspects of the company.”  Instead of having a profound understanding of the technical and operational issues, Rickover understood generalist-leaders might not possess the comprehensive understanding of the mission and that without this essential knowledge, could well face a too-tempting inclination to focus issues that are easy to measure, administrative, or even urgent but are not related to the mission.   Rather, Rickover called for leaders to help fulfill the essential role of having individuals working on the aforementioned “right things.”  Rickover would propose that those who depend exclusively on staff, slides, or software to understand what’s going on are likely to lose touch, or restated, he felt that filtering can kill a leader’s ability to lead a complex organization as it strives to accomplish its mission

Rickover also felt strategy, policy, and doctrine, while interesting and important, can be distracting as they can serve to crowd out painful, difficult, and generally unglamorous tactical detail and mission-related work.  Rickover, working in a complex, dynamic, and interconnected environment, found resolving small issues and details was necessary or these difficult endeavors would fail. He argued there is no substitute for a leader’s experience and knowledge, and a profound corporate memory will be a beneficial natural consequence of those two strengths.

As with the individual, a leader’s authority and responsibility must be matched.  Responsibility to the mission comes before all other obligations, to include personal ambition, achievement, and comfort.  Rickover said the person who says or thinks ‘I’m not responsible’ is correct; the person is being irresponsible.  Conversely, Rickover saw when “everyone’s responsible,” no one’sresponsible.

The Organization

Rickover indirectly posits that organizations should exist to provide a framework that helps individuals complete the mission through unity of effort.  However, Rickover was a contrarian who favored self-organizing and opposed hierarchically-driven institutions.  In today’s language, Rickover could be described as advocating for natural work groups (or teams) or self-managing teams.  He used a condemning phrase to describe a systemic organizational flaw he too often observed, which provided organizational leaders the latitude “to do less than is necessary.”

He provided organizational assessments that were troubling in 1982 and remain of concern today.  Rickover opined the traditional DoD process created unintended consequences which generated institutional and personal inexperience and nonaccountability, and that by the time the individual or leader had well grasped their job, it was time to rotate out.  Radical change, like designing, building, and operating nuclear-powered carriers, cruisers, and submarines, did not and does not come easy, and organizational flaws certainly add to the challenge.  Rickover’s nuclear Navy organization is still remarkably successful because individuals and leaders are required to expertly know their business.

Rickover in Retrospect

You don’t serve over 60 years without garnering some high-level attention and when Rickover pinned-on his fourth star, President Richard Nixon had this to say about him, “…once genius is submerged by bureaucracy, a nation is doomed to mediocrity.” In hindsight, it’s not difficult to see that Rickover’s “genius” was based largely on the Edisonian proposition of hard work: that is, one percent inspiration and ninety-nine percent perspiration.  The perspiration was no doubt an acceptable trade-off to Rickover, a man who had lived through two world wars, wars in Korean and Vietnam, and the Cold War.

These experiences placed Rickover as a man who clearly understood the value of the nation’s nuclear deterrent force that he worked so diligently to enhance.  Evidence of this was shown at Rickover’s memorial service in 1986.  There, former President Jimmy Carter read the John Milton poem On His Blindness to honor Rickover.  The poem concludes with the line   “…They also serve who only stand and wait.”  While standing and waiting do not appear to parts of Hyman Rickover’s basic character, they well describe the importance of diligence, preparedness, and readiness he ascribed to of America’s nuclear deterrent force.

Mark Stout is a researcher at Air University’s National Space Studies Center.  Mr. Stout occasionally posts at the blog Songs of Space and Nuclear War.  Larry Chandler is a retired Air Force Colonel working on the effort to revitalize the USAF Nuclear Enterprise.  The opinions expressed here are those of the authors’ alone and may not reflect the views and policies of the US Air Force or the Department of Defense.