Can You Take Calls For Nuclear Disarmament Seriously Without Serious Arguments?

Seriously?

The article Taking disarmament seriously, as with many arms control advocacy pieces, presumes what it sets out to prove.

That doesn’t work for me.  I can’t take disarmament arguments seriously without serious arguments.  Arms controllers tend to be full of “we gotta” while ignoring the “and here’s how we’re gonna” part.

So in the “we gotta” regard, the article attempts to build a sense of crisis regarding nuclear war while attributing the lack of nuclear war to luck, which, sans evidence, is a hard thing to do.  The “we gotta” also always assumes the efficacy of arms control treaties.

Russia Balks At Another Bilateral Nuke Deal

New Nuclear Cuts Must Be Multilateral, Ergo There Will Be No More Cuts

Russia appears to be happy with their place in the nuclear world.

Why is that?  Because they are satisfied with where they think new START will leave them on the strategic side vis-a-vis the U.S. and the rest of the world, and they will also be keeping their massive inventory of tactical nuclear weapons.

At least that’s the conclusion you can draw from Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.

This first means that Russia can modernize their strategic forces as they see fit.

Next, strategically speaking , it also means they don’t plan to go much lower than new START unless such efforts are done multilaterally (pretty unlikely).

Finally, it also signals that Russia is unwilling to cut their tactical nuclear weapons unless such an effort is done multilaterally, again, pretty unlikely.

Arms Controllers Appeal To Authority

I’m always amazed at the appeal to authority thrown down by those advocating the new START.

It’s as predictable as the day is long: appeal to authority.  Then the use of the word “modest” to describe the treaty.  Next, ad hominem attacks on those who would question the wisdom of arms control.  Finally, the attempt to build a false sense of crisis.

How about an appeal to logic?  How about full and robust debate on the strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities of the treaty and same regarding the non-ratification/entry into force of the treaty?

New START On Shaky Ground?

According to the LA Times, if new START is not ratified by the Senate, it will be for three reasons:

1. Missile defense concerns
2. Nuclear modernization concerns
3. Verification concerns

Not mentioned are a few other areas critics bring forward:

1. Lack of an integrated security effect–Russia’s ten-to-one tactical nuclear weapons are ignored
2. Lack of effect on nuclear proliferation
3. Weak or non-effect of a bilateral treaty in a multilateral nuclear world

The second group tends to be glossed over by the arms-control industry.

Attack of the Zeros

Foreign Policy has an interesting article that spans much of the spectrum regarding the current nuclear state-of-play.  New START, Nuclear Policy Review, and Proliferation?  Check, check, and check.

The article kicks things off with a short critique of the flick Nuclear Tipping Point which James Traub describes as “an old-fashioned eye-glazer” and features the fab four of arms control (Sam Nunn, William Perry, George Shultz, and Henry Kissinger) “speaking against a black background while portentous kettledrums thump offstage.”

These four are the face of the Nuclear Security Project, “an effort to galvanize global action to reduce urgent nuclear dangers and build support for reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, ultimately ending them as a threat to the world.”

Their web pages asks ‘what if Al Qaeda gets a nuclear weapon?’

The answer: all of our time and efforts on new START have been grossly and pathetically misplaced.

Ah but back to the article.  In time, the issue of bilateral nuclear disarmament as a precondition to the endstate of achieving a world without nuclear weapons is addressed.  The answer, coming from an administration arms-controller: These (that is, unilateral or bilateral disarmament) are propositions that have to be demonstrated.”

Well said.

Non-kudos for the implication that the U.S. has nuclear bombers still on alert. We haven’t had that condition for almost 20 years.

Facing Reality: ‘New’ START Won’t Be Quickly Ratified

Defense News relays the obvious, which is news because expectation management is being exercised.  The administration doesn’t expect new START to be ratified quickly.

I’d expect U.S. nuclear modernization and perhaps missile defense will become more closely linked to new START ratification. Months ago the administration attempted to sweeten the deal with a proposed plus-up of $5 billion (across five years) largely for the nuclear labs.

The labs are of course essential but it is useful to address the fact they are only a part of the nation’s overall nuclear enterprise.

BTW, just how new START adds to global stability is unclear because the two participating nations, the U.S. and Russia, are…well, pretty stable, at least as far as our nuclear capabilities go.

New START is instead a bilateral team-building exercise and serves as a confirmation of directions that both Russia and the U.S. are intending to take regardless of the actions of the other.  As such, it is perhaps a convenient exercise.

We’re really much less concerned with Russia’s nuclear intentions than those of China and Pakistan (let alone Iran), but those fall into the ‘wicked problem’ category.

If the Senate thought new START would clearly and demonstrably enhance U.S.national security (versus ‘global stability’ per se) wouldn’t they already have taken action on it?

Kremlin source says START ready for signing

In the olden days, back when Dick Nixon was President, an arms control treaty like START might have been big news.

We’re not in the olden days anymore.

Will PM Putin throw in some eleventh-hour show-stopper designed to make the U.S. look like Elmer Fudd?

World War II? Nothing to do with Stalin, says Russia’s President

Perhaps you thought Ramses was the king of denial?

The sort of Russian “thinking” outlined in this article should be a serious caveat emptor for the administration as they work with the Russians on arms control and missile defense issues. If this is the sort of stuff they’re selling, I’m hoping we’re not buying.

Obama Puts Arms Control at Core of New Strategy

I’m not sure why the WSJ ran this article. It will not provide any profound insights and contains a number of non sequiturs. The title is eye-catching (well, to some), but the lead paragraph immediately launches into nuclear deterrence, which we know from our studies is not the same as arms control. The article’s purpose is further opaqueified when it then moves into the human rights arena.

Author Peter Spiegel points out the administration’s attempt to link human-rights and U.S. democratization efforts, using President Ronald Reagan as a model, since he “engaged with Soviet leaders on arms control even as he condemned their human-rights record.” Left unsaid was that President Reagan was able to engage from a position of strength, having plussed-up the nation’s nuclear capabilities with the Pershing II , Ground Launched Cruise Missile and Peacekeeper ICBM. systems.

The take-away is the assessment by Brent Scowcroft, who thinks the world is at a tipping point regarding nuclear proliferation. If Iran goes nuclear (anyone think they won’t?), will Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey follow? North Korea’s already gone nuclear and Japan has responded by buying more missile defense. Will they reach a point when they go nuclear, too?

Mail In The Nuclear Posture Review?

Tally ho on the reset button? Well, at one level, it may appear so.

Per public law, the purpose of the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review is to establish U.S. nuclear deterrence policy, strategy, and force posture for the next 5 to 10 years. It seems unclear how the NPR’s call for a measured, deliberate, consultative, and “whole of government” approach squares with the President’s proclamation that U.S. nuclear forces will be categorically reduced.